FOX ET AL. vs. REVENUE CUTTER.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States. Northern District of
Ohio. March Term, 1860.
ROBERT R. FOX, THEODORE POLHEMUS, ABRAHAM D. POLHEMUS AND
RICHARD VAN WYCK, VS. THE REVENUE CUTTER NO. 1.
1. The assignment, by the builders of a vessel, of the moneys to become due on the
building contract, invests the assignee vith no such proprietary interest as will
enable him to appear as claimant and defend.
2. The purchase by the government of a vessel for the revenue service, does not
divest the same of valid liens existing at the time the title was acquired. The
government takes cum onere, and the liens may be enforced by the ordinary
methods.
8. Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts of the
United States, on the western lakes and rivers, under the Constitution and Act
of 1789, is independent of the Act of 1845, and unrestricted thereby.

This was one of some thirty or more separate libels filed by these
libellants, and others, against Revenue Cutters numbered (originally)
One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, built by Merry & Gay, ship
builders, at Milan, Ohio under contract with the Government, in
1858, and designed for service on the western lakes.
The libels, respectively, were for materials furnished the builders
for the construction of these vessels, and were founded upon liens
acquired under the Mechanics Lien Law of Ohio.
Pleas to the jurisdiction were interposed by the United States
District Attorney, Hon. Geo. W. Belden, in behalf of the Government, and by Hon. R. P. Spalding on behalf Of Andrews & Otis,
claiming, 1st, that these vessels, by a true construction of the contract between the builders and the government, belonged to the
government ab initio, and that if so no lien attached, as liens could
not be acquired against government property, and because in order
to come within the provisions of the statute relied upon, the materials
must have been furnished by virtue of a contract with the then
owners of the vessels ; and
2d. That the government having taken possession of the cutters
before these proceedings were instituted, the liens, if any existed,
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were cut off, or at all events could not be enforced by seizure of
public property. They cited 2 Dodson, 103, 451; 3 Hall, Amer.
L. R. 128; Bees Ad. 112-422; 1 Dal. R. 77; 7 Cranch, 439;
7 Eng. C. L., 434; 4 Howard, 20, 286.
Wiley & Carey, contra, for the libellants, claimed
1st. That Andrews & Otis having no proprietary interest in the
vessels, but only in a portion of the contract price, by assignment
from the builders, could have no such persona standi in judicio as
would entitle them to be recognized as claimants.
2d. That the vessels continued to be the property of the builders
until they were completed and delivered to the officers of the government, and by them accepted-that where anything remains to
be done before the sale of .personal property is complete, no title
passes. They cited Long on Sales, 267; Chitty on Contracts,
375-8; 2 Green. Ev., 528; 6 East., 614; 15 J. R., 349; 21
Pick, 384; 2 Wend. 135; Story on Con., Sec. 18, Story on Sales,
Sec. 296; 2 Kent, p. 496.
3d. That although the cases cited might establish the doctrine
that liens could not be acquired against public property, yet that
if such liens existed at the time the property was acquired by the
government, they were not thereby divested or discharged. They
cited- 3 Sumner, 308; Curtis' Mer., Sec. 317 ; 9 Whea., 409 ; 1
Dal., 77; Arg. of Attorney General, page 82.
In overruling the pleas to the jurisdiction, the opinion of the
court was delivered by
WILSON, J. This is a proceeding in rem, to recover the value of
materials furnished by the libellants in the building of a vessel,
which at the time of its seizure, in this suit, was owned by the United
States, and in the use of the revenue service.
The account as it appears itemized in the:schedule, accrued at
various periods between the 22d day of November, 1856, and the
15th day of June, 1857. The materials were supplied to Merry &
Gay, of Milan, who were contractors with the United States (through
the Secretary of the Treasury) for the building of six revenue cutters for the revenue service of the government.
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The libellants claim the right to this proceeding in the admiralty
by virtue of a lien acquired by them upon the vessels under the
statute laws of Ohio, of March 11th, 1843, and the act amendatory
thereto, passed March 12, 1853.
The first parties who seek to be admitted upon the record, to
defend as claimants, are Andrews & Otis. They were bankers at
Milan, and (it is said) furnished Merry & Gay a large sum of money
to aid in the construction of these vessels, taking as security therefor, on the 1st of August, 1857, all Merry & Gay's demands and
claim upon the government by virtue of said contract of building,
and also any and all interest they might then have in the vessels.
The second claimant is the government of the United States,
which, by the District Attorney, has filed its claim to the absolute
ownership of the property, and has also answered,.setting forth
among other things, that the vessel in question, at the time of its
seizure by process in this suit, was u public armed vessel of the
United States, actually employed in the revenue service of the government; and it is insisted, in the answer filed by the District
Attorney, that the vessel being so owned and employed, is exonerated and discharged from all liens of individuals which accrued
during her construction, and is also exempt from seizure upon process in rem in the admiralty, to enforce the lien thus acquired.
The first point we are called upon to consider is, whether Andrews & Otis have the kind of interest in the suit requisite to
establish a

-

"

pers ona standit in judicio."

It is not sufficient to entitle a party to intervene and defend,
when it is simply shown that he has an interest in the question litigated. He must have rights in the vessel itself, that is, an ownership either general or special in the property, or such a claim as
operates directly upon it, by way of a-lien statutory or maritime.
Hence it is necessary to inquire into the sort of interest, if any,
acquired by- Andrews & Otis in the revenue cutter seized in this
suit. And for this purpose we must examine some of the terms of
the contract entered into by and between the United States and
Merry & Gay, for the construction of these vessels, and the subsequent assignments of the latter to the United States and to An-
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drews & Otis, with reference to the respective dates and the purposes
of those assignments.
The contract for building the vessels bears date Nov. 17, 1856.
By its terms, Merry & Gay were to construct, equip, and deliver
afloat to the United States, six cutters of 50 tons burthen each.
They were to furnish the labor and materials for the building and
equipment, at their own expense; and it was further stipulated, that
on each of said cutters being so far advanced as to be planked,
ceiled, and decks laid, the government should pay $2,025 to Merry &
Gay, they executing an assignment of said vessels as a further security for said advances, and upon completion and delivery, agreeably
to the terms of the contract, a final payment of $2,025 for each,
was to be made in full satisfaction.
On the 25th day of April, 1857, Merry & Gay received from the
United States $2,025, the first instalment provided for in said
agreement, and thereupon executed and delivered to the government agent, for the benefit of the United States, a full and unconditional assignment and transfer of their interest in said cutter
No. 1, which assignment was duly filed by said agent in the Clerk's
office of the township of Milan, but, nevertheless, was so received
and filed as a mortgage security for the advance made.
On the 8th of September, 1857, the said six revenue cutters having been fully finished and equipped by Merry & Gay, (and who up
to that time had retained exclusive possession and control of them,)
were delivered by the contractors to the government agent, and
accepted by him in full satisfaction of the fulfillment of the contract
to the government on the part of Merry & Gay.
By an instrument of writing, bearing date August 1st, 1857,
Merry & Gay assigned and set over to Andrews & Otis, all their
interest in said cutters, and all claim to the second instalment due
,them from the United States, under the contract of 17th Nov. 1856,
being the sum of $12,150; and on the 4th of September, 1851, a
like assignment was made of a further claim against the United
States of $14,000, being the amount allowed by the government to
Merry & Gay for extra work and materials.
Upon this statement the whole transaction in relation to the con-
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struction, title and incumbrances upon said cutter No. 1, it is as
difficult for us to perceive any lien acquired by Andrews & Otis
upon the vessel as it is to find in them any right of property to it.
By the assignment of August 1st, 1857, Andrews & Otis obtained
no other lien than that possessed by Merry & Gay. Itis not pretended
that the latter ever acquired an~r lien by virtue of the local laws.
Nor, in my opinion, was any conferred by the general maritime law.
The vessel was built at Milan in the State of Ohio, which place, to all
intents and purposes was her home port. The United States could
not, in any sense, be deemed a foreign contractor. And under the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
the People's _Ferry Co. of Boston vs. Josepht Beers et al, 20 How.
893, pronounced at the December term, 1857, a contract for building "adomestic ship cannot be regarded as a maritime contract. The
court in that case say, "the contract is simply for building the hull
of a ship, and delivering it on the water. She was constructed and
delivered according to contract. The admiralty jurisdiction is limited to contracts, claims and services purely maritime, and touching
rights and duties appertaining to commerce and naiigation." And
the court adopt the language of Judge Hopkinson, used in 1781, and
declare, as respects ship-builders, that " the practice of former times
doth not justify the Admiralty's taking cognizance of their suits. In that case the court advanced still further in restricting maritime
liens upon what was declared to be 'without the jurisdiction of the
Admiralty, in Pratt vs. Reed, 19 How. 359. The case decided by
thd Supreme Court at the late December term, was simply one where
a vessel owned in New Jersey was built in that State by the libellants, on credit, and without any express pledge of the vessel for
the debt, and where no lien was provided or secured by the local
law. And the court say, in the opinion delivered, that "the ques•tion presented involves a contest between the State and federal
governrients. The latter has no power or jurisdiction beyond what
the constitution confers. The contest here (say the court) is not so
much between rival tribunals as between distinct sovereignties claiming to exercise power over contracts, property, and personal franchises. What were meant in 1789 by "cases of admiralty and mar-
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time jurisdiction," must be meant now. What was reserved to the
States to be regulated by their own institutions, cannot be rightfully infringed by the general government, either through its legislative or judiciary department."
It is our purpose to dispose of questions of admiralty law in subordination to the judgments and d&isions of the Supreme Court of
the United States, how much soever those decisions may vary from
the rules of law .previously established by maritime courts upon the
same subject. Under its decisions, and the principles of law enunciated by that court, the contract between Merry & Gay and the
United States was not a maritime contract. Nor did the money
advanced by Andrews & Otis for the building of these revenue cutters impose a maritime lien which attached to the vessels.
It is clear, then, that Merry & Gay having no lien by virtue of
the contract for building, none was transferred by their assignment
to Andrews & Otis. It is equally clear that the assignment to
Andrews & Otis did not, nor was it intended to pass the legal titlo
to the property. The purpose of the assignment was to transfer to
the assignees the unpaid claim upon the government. It was the
palpable intention to give the assignees all the rights to the claim,
and the facilities for its collection, that the assignors possessed.
Merry & Gay retained the property, finished the construction of the
vessels and exercised exclusive ownership over them, until they were
delivered over to the government agent on the 8th of September,
1857.
So far, then, as Andrews & Otis are concerned, they have neither
a ju8 ad rem nor. a ju8 in re, and consequently cannot be admitted
upon the record as claimants to defend in this suit.
We proceed to the other branch of the case, and inquire, whether
a vessel owned by the United States, and actually employed in the
revenue service, is exonerated and discharged:from all liens of individuals which'accrued before the government obtained title, and
whether it is consequently exempt from seizure upon process in rem
in the admiralty, to enforce such lien.
It is not deemed necessary to discuss the point as to the time
when the United States acquired title to this revenue cutter. We
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are satisfied from an examination of the contract between the government and Merry & Gay, that the title was in the latter until the
vessel was completed and delivered to the government agent in
September, 1857, and received and accepted by him in fulfillment
of 'the terms of the contract. Nor is it necessary to inquire into the
character and effect of the assignment to the government of Merry
& Gay's interest in the vessel, which was made oti the 25th day of.
April, 1857. Nor do we understand it to be seriously controverted
by counsel, that the libellants acquired a valid lien under the State
law, while the vessel was owned and in the possession and control.
of the builders.
We'have, then, the naked proposition presented, of the extinction
of a valid lien upon a vessel by the acquisitibn of title to it by the.
government, and its use in the revenue service. This is not a case
of contract for supplies to the United States. The position taken by.
counsel in the argument, and the authorities cited by them, in support of it, that in contracts for supplies, or repairs for government
ships, no lien can be presumed to exist, does not reach the real question, the solution of which is decisive of this controversy. In that
class of cases, Mr. Justice Story well remarked in LTsited States vs.,
Wilder, 3 Sumner, 310, "that there may be a just foundation ,fra distinction as to liens between the case of the government -andthat of a mere private person. It may perhaps be justly inferred.
in many cases, from the nature of certain contracts, and employmqnts
and services of the government, that no lien attaches thereto. For
example, it may be true that no lien exists for repairs of a public
ship, or for materials furnished therefor, or for wages duethe crew;
or for work,and labor performed on the arms, artillery, camp equipage, and other warlike equipments of the government.. In such cases
the nature and use of the articles, as the means of military and naval
operations, may repel any notion of a lien grounded upon the obvious
intention of the parties." And the reason is, that when the con-.
tract is made with the government, the presumption of the law shol.
be, that the credit was given solely to the government without any
reliance, as a security, upon such implements of military and naval,
warfare. The argument ab inconvenientihas no force, except in
30
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that class of cases where the contract is made directly with the
government, and where, from public policy, the materials are deemed
to be supplied and the labor performed upon the credit of the nation,
the reliance for payment resting solely upon its justice and good
faith. But in relation to the rights of the government and the immunities of property purchased by it, whether real or personal, a very
different rule of law obtains, founded upon equally sound reasons.
If property is obtained by purchase, the government acquires no
better title than that possessed by its vendor. If the property is
legally incumbered by morgtgage or other liens, the transfer of title
does not divest it of those incumbrances. In this respect the government stands upon the same footing as that of individuals. In controversies in courts of justice, involving the rights of property, it
*has no muniments of title sanctified by sovereignty which should
exempt it from the rules of law governing individuals in like cases.
No well considered case can be found any where, which declares
that bare possession of property by the government, when wrongfully obtained, of necessity changes the title and vests it in the
sovereignty, or if justly obtained, that such possession extinguishes
the lawful liens of individuals upon it. Such a doctrine would be
monstrous, and an anomaly in a nation whose government is one of
just laws, and whose constitution declares that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
In the case at bar, there is no privity of contract between the
libellants and the government of the United States. The transaction was with, and the credit given to, Merry & Gay, and security
for the debt obtained by a lien upon the vessel under and by virtue
.of the law of the sovereign State of Ohio. The sovereignty, which
-by just and constitutional law imposes and secures the lien, will
recognize, and if need be, may by law enforce the remedy. This
remedy, however, may be obtained by pioceedings in a court of
admiralty under the 12th rule prescribed by the Supreme Court of
the United States; which rule provides "that in all suits by material
.men for supplies or repairs, or other necessaries for a foreign ship,
or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the
ship and freight in rem, or against the master or owner alone in
personam, and the like proceedings in rem shall apply in cases of
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domestic ships, where by the local law a lien is given to material
men for supplies or other necessaries."
Entertaining these views, the exceptions of the libellants to the
claim and answer of Andrews & Otis, are sustained, and the exceptions of the United States to the libel are overruled.
This cause again came on to be heard on a further objection to the
jurisdiction, and on the merits.
Belden and Spalding, for the respondent, on the evidence,
clainiing1st. That credit was given to the builders, and not in any manner
to the vessels.
2d. That the liens, if any attached, had been waived by the subsequent transactions of the parties.
And it was further claimed, that these vessels, not being "enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade," or employed in the business of commerce and navigation," &c., were not within the purview of the Act of Congress of February 26, 1845, and were
therefore not the subjects of admiralty jurisdiction.
"Willey and Cary/, contra, for the libellants, insisted1st. That it is no objection that credit is given to several vessels
collectively, and not to each separately, provided that which actually
entered into the construction of each can be-afterwards ascertained.
7 Watts & Serg. 881; 13 Pa. S. Rep. 167; 17 idem, 234. The
Kiersage, 2 Curtis, 253; 2 Ohio S. R. 114.
2d. That under the Mechanics' lien law, no proof of credit being
given to the structure is required, 18 Ohio R. 202.
3d. Negotiable paper received is no payment or waiver of lien.
3 McL. R. 265; 4 idem, 128; The rakion, New. R. 52; 6 McL.
472 ; The barque Okausen, 2 Story, 455 ; The sch. Active, 2 Olcott,
286; Flanders Shipp. 841, 374; Ware, 185, Davies, 112; Sutton
vs. The Albatross, 1 Am. Law Reg. 87. Giving credit is no waiver.
1 Sumn. 73; Davies, 112. Must be clear evidence that lien is
waived. Newberry R. 55; 2 Story, 468; Davies, 112. Always
the pre8umption that new securities are taken merely as auxilliary.
Davies, 114, 119; 5 Phil. Ev. 3 ed., C. & H's Notes, 234.
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4th. That section 2 of article 3 of the constitution, confers admiralty jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and section 9 of the
judiciary act of 1789, assigns this jurisdiction to the District
Courts.
The jurisdiction thus granted is without limitation, so far as ordinary seizures are concerned, for it will be found, on inspection, that
the language which follows this grant of jurisdiction, and which
refers to seizures made on waters navigable from the sea, &c., is
limited to "seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade."
The steamboat Magnolia, 20 Howard 309, Mr. Justice Daniell.
Hence, as no such limitations as are contained in the act of 1845,
existed at the time the constitution was adopted, it follows, that
under the constitution, as construed in 12 Howard 443, and the
Act of 1789, general original admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was
possessed by the District Courts upon the lakes and rivers as well
as upon the seaboard, before this act of 1845 was passed, and this
without any limitation, except as to "seizures under laws of
impost," &c.
The whole question, then, is narrowed down to this: Is the Act
of 1845 to be treated as a restrainingstatute, or as-merely cumulative to the Act of 1789 ? In other words, is an Act passed for the
purpose, as avowed in its title, of " extending the jurisdiction of the
District Courts," to be so construed as to limit and abridge the
jurisdiction they already possessed ?
A later act cannot repeal or modify a prior one, except by express
terms, or necessary implication, and this implication must be founded
upon a clear repugnancy of the latter with the former statute. See
authorities on the interpretation of statutes, collated in Curwen's
Revised Laws of Ohio, 13, 17; 15 Ohio R. 65; 3 Hill, 41; 15 J. R.
220, 16 Peters, 362 ; 3 Howard, 646. Hence the Act of 1845 is to
be treated merely as cumulative, and in fact superfluous, not as
restrictive or abridging; and if so, the objection that these vessels
were not enrolled and licensed, or engaged in commerce and navigation, is of no avail, because no such limitations exist in the
statute of 1789, which, as we have seen, stands unaffected by the
Act of 1845.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
WILSON, J.-The most important matter for consideration in this
case is involved in the question of the jurisdiction of the court over
the vessel seized, as the record shows such vessel was not enrolled
and licensed for the coasting trade, or engaged in the business of
commerce and navigation between different States.
This inquiry, more properly, should have been disposed of it the
ince~tion of proceedings in the cause, but its great practical importance has induced us to reserve the point for decision till the final
hearing.
The question of jurisdiction arises upon the construction of the
9th section of the judiciary act of 1789, (vol. 1, stat. 76,) and the
legal effect to be given to the act of 26 February, 1845, (5 vol.
stat. 726.)
Itis claimed by the counsel for the respondent, that this vessel not
being enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, or employed in business of commerce and navigation, &c., was not within the purview
of the act of 1845, and, consequently, was not subject to admiralty
process in rem in the District Court of the United States.
The consideration of this branch of the case demands a careful
examination of the Constitution of the United States, and the acts
of Congress by which admiralty jurisdiction is conferred upon the
federal courts.
'Section 2, article 3, of the constitution, declares that the judicial
power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiraity
and maritime jurisdiction.
The 9th section of the judiciary act of 1789 provides, that "the
District Courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures
under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States, when
the 8eizures are made on Waters which are navigable from the sea
by- vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high seas."
In the case of Jackson et al. vs. Steamboat -magnolia,20 How.
R. 298, Mr. Justice Grier, in delivering the opinion of the court,
says, that "before the adoption of the present constitution, each
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State, in the exercise of its sovereign power, had its own court of
admiralty, having jurisdiction over the harbors, creeks, inlets, and
public navigable waters connected with the sea.
This jurisdiction was exercised not only over rivers, creeks and
inlets, which were boundaries to or passed through other State6, but
also when they were wholly within the State. Such a distinction
was unknown. Nor had these courts been driven from the exercise
of jurisdiction over torts committed on navigable waters within the
body of a coufity, by the common law courts.
When, therefore, the exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over its public rivers, ports and havens, was surrendered by each
State to the Government of the United States, without any exception as to subjects and places, this court cannot interpolate into the
constitution, or introduce an arbitrary distinction which has no
foundation in reason or precedent."
It had been previously held by the same high authority.12 How.
R. 444, that, "there is nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that
makes the water peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor
anything in the absence of the tide that renders it unfit. If it is
public navigable water on which commerce is carried on between
different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely
the same. And if a distinction is made on that account, it is merely
arbitrary, without any foundation in reas6n, and contrary to it."
The Chief Justice, in the case of the Genesee Ohief, with a just
and comprehensive view of the rights and necessities of the people
in the States bordering upon the lakes, declares, that "courts of
admiralty have been found necessary in all commercial countries,
not only for the safety and convenience of commerce and a speedy
decision of controversies when delay would be ruin, but also to
administer the laws of nations in a season of war, and to determine
the validity of captures, and questions of prize or no prize, in a judicial proceeding. And it would be contrary to the first principles
on which this Union was founded, to confine these rights to the
States bordering on the Atlantic and to tide water rivers connected
with it, and deny them to the citizens who border on the lakes and
the great navigable streams of the Western States. Certainly such
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was not the intention of the framers of the constitution ; and if such
be the construction finally given to it, it must necessarily produce
great public inconvenience, and at the same time fail to accomplish
one of the great objects of the framers of the constitution, that is,
perfect equality in the rights and privileges of the citizens of the
different States, not only in the laws of thegeneral government, but
ii the mode of administering them."
This exposition, by the Supreme Court, of the power given in the
constitution to the general government over all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, is conclusive, that Congress has authority
to confer this jurisdiction upon the federal courts, to the full extent
of power possessed by the judges of the vice-admiralty courts in
this country under the colonial system, and the State admiralty
courts under the confederation; and that this jurisdiction is not
affected by the restraining statutes of Richard II and Henry IV of
England.
The next inquiry is, whether Congress, in framing the 9th section
of the judiciary act, failed to carry out this great purpose of equality
in the laws of the United States, and the mode of administering
them in all the States of the Union, .without any exception as to the
subjects and places.
The first clause of the section quoted,.provides that "the District
Courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
This provision is complete in itself, and investg the District Courts
with absolute admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, without any
restriction as to the powers conferred, or any limitation as to the
subjects and places for the exercise of those powers: And unless
the succeeding clause in this 9th section was intended to restrict the
former, then there can be no doubt of the authority of the District
Courts to exercise, by virtue of the statute, admiralty jurisdiction
over vessels upon the waters of the great lakes.
We again quote the language of the succeeding clause, to wit:
"including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of
the United States, when the seizures are made on waters which are
navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen,
within their respective districts, as well as upon the high seas."
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The statute, by words of well defined meaning, in the first clause
confers upon the District Courts admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In the second clause, it confers upon the District Courts jurisdiction of a class of common law cases, over which courts of admiralty had never before taken cognizance.
In England, seizures under the laws of imposts were peculiarly
cognizable in the Court of Exchequer under the authority and process of the common law. Cases of forfeiture for breaches of the
revenue laws were cognizable in the Exchequer upon information,
though seizure was made upon navigable waters ; and the question
of fact, on which the forfeiture arose, was always tried by a jury.
And such also was the course of procedure in the Exchequer, for
the violation of the navigation laws. In the case of the Attorney
General v. Jackson, Bunb. R. 236, the seizure was of a vessel for
the breach of the "act of navigation," and the proceeding was by
information and trial by jury, according to the course of the common law.
Congress, in the exercise of its authority, under the Constitution,
to establish the federal courts, did not see fit to create a Court of
Exchequer. It established the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts,
and defined their powers. It was competent to give to either of
them the administration of the laws relating to imposts, navigation
and trade. It was given to the District Courts, to be exercised
within their respective districts, when seizures should be made on
waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more
tons burthen. This authority and its limitation had reference to
the exigencies of the foreign trade of the country, and to the enforcement of revenue laws relating to imposts. It was doubtless
supposed that vessels, employed in the foreign trade and navigating
the ocean, would exceed ten tons burthen, and that in carrying on
the commercial operations of the country, such vessels would enter
the rivers, inlets and bays, whose waters are navigable from the
sea.
The giving to the District Courts cognizance over this class of
common law cases, was not essential, nor was it intended to give
strength to the admiralty powers previously conferred. The 'nis-
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diction of the court over one class of cases has no necessary connection with th6 jurisdiction over the other. And hence, by no rule
of construction, can the limitation of the jurisdiction of the court
over seizures, under laws of imposts, made upon waters navigable
from the sea, be held to limit the jurisdiction of the court in the
exercise of its powers in admiralty and maritime cases. A contrary rule of construction would make the statute an instrument of
injustice, and defeat the great purpose of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
We hold, then, that by virtue of the 9th section of the judiciary
act of 1789, the District Courts of the United States have precisely
the same admiralty jurisdiction upon the great lakes as tipon' the
navigable waters of the seaboard ; and that the maritime law has
the same application to cases upon these inland seas, as it has to
those on tide waters.
We now proceed to examine and consider the operation and legal
effect of the act of February 26, 1845.
This law provides, that "the District Courts of the United States
shall have, possess, and exercise the same jurisdiction in matters of
contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats and
other vessels of twenty tons burthen and upwards, enrolled and
-licensed for the coasting trade, and at the time employed in business and commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and, Territories upon the lakes and navigable waters
connecting said lakes, -as is now possessed -and exercised by the
said courts in cases of the like steamboats and other vessels employed in navigation and commerce upon the high seas, or tide
waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States ; and in all suits brought into such courts, in all such- tiat.
ters of contract or tort, the remedies and the forms of process, and
the modes of proceeding, shall be the same as are or may -be usedby such courts in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and
the maritime law of tle United States, so far as the same is-or may
be applicable thereto, shall constitute the rule of decision in such
suits, in the same manner, and to the same extent, and with the
same equities, as it now does in cases of admiralty and maritime
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jurisdiction ; saving, however, to parties the right of trial by jury
of all facts put in issue in such suits, where either party shall
require it; and saving also to the parties the right of a concurrent
remedy at the common law, when it is competent to give it, and any
concurrent remedy which may be given by the State laws, where
such steamer or other vessel is employed in such business of commerce and navigation."
The circumstances, and the apparent necessity which induced
Congress to enact this law, are well understood by the profession
in the States bordering upon the great lakes. Previous to the year
1845, the Supreme Court of the United States had, by a uniform
course of decision, adopted the theory of the English courts, of
limiting the jurisdiction of the admiralty to waters subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide. In the case of The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson vs. Johnson et al., 10 Wheat. R. 428, decided in 1825, it
was held that the admiralty had no jurisdiction over contracts for
the hire of seamen, except in cases where the service was performed
upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.
This was a leading case, and the opinion of the court was pronounced.
by Mr. Justice Story, who was pre-eminent for his learning, and
whose expositions of constitutional and maritime law have ever commanded respect at home and abroad. But this learned jurist evidently saw and felt the injustice of the rule of law established in
that case; for he there put the qucere whether, under the power to
regulate commerce, Congress might not extend the remedy, by the
summary process of the admiralty, to the case of voyages on the
western waters. - And, in the opinion delivered, he gave the significant suggestion (since acted on by Congress) that "if the public
inconvenience from the want of process of an analogous nature, shall
he extensively felt, the attention of the legislature will doubtless be
drawn to the subject."
The same doctrine of limiting the admiralty jurisdiction to tide
water, was again affirmed in 1887, by the same court, in case of
The Steamboat Orleans vs. Phcebus, 11 Peters' R. 175. This continued and apparently settled interpretation of the Constitution by
the highest judicial tribunal of the country, and its palpable injus-

FOX ET AL. vw. REVENUE CUTTER.

tice to those connected with the great commercial marine of the
lakes, left to Congress no other alternative than to profit by the
suggestion of the court, intimated in the case of the Thomas Jefferson, and if possible by legislation, to mitigate the evil and soften the
injustice resulting from the doctrine of those cases.
It was this condition of things that brought about the passage of
the act of February 26, 1845. This law is entitled "An Act to
extend the jurisdiction of the District Courts to certain cases upon
the lakes and navigable waters connecting the same." The act,
neither in its title or its body, purports to confer upon the District
Courts admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, nor was such the purpose of its framers. It authorizes quasi admiralty proceedings in
certain cases, it is true. But it is clear that Congress did not look
to the second section of the third article of the Constitution for its
authority to pass the act, for, at that time, it was well settled by
the judgment of the Supreme Court, that this second section did
not invest the government of the United States with any power to
confer upon the federal courts admiralty jurisdiction over waters
not affected by the tide.
It is equally clear, that in passing the act, Congress looked for
its authority solely to the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution, which declares that "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several -States."
Under this provision it had been repeatedly held, that Congress has
power to legislate over navigation as well as trade; that it has
power to prescribe what shall constitute American vessels, and the
national character of the seamen who shall navigate them; and also
to prescribe rules and regulations for the intercourse and navigation
of such vessels between the different States and Territories.
But the act of 1845 does not repeal or otherwise abrogate the 9th
section of the law of 1789, or any part of it. At most, it can only
be regarded as affording remedies which are cumulative upon former
laws. It designates a class of vessels of 20 tons burthen and upwards that are' enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and at.
the time employed in business of commerce and navigation between
ports and places in different States and Territories upon the lakes.
It makes no provision in relation to vessels engaged in the foreign
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trade; nor does it embrace remedies upon a large variety of maritime contracts, having no connection with the navigation and trade
between different States.
We know of no rule of construction by which the act of 1845
should be held to have the effect of repealing any portion of the 9th
section of the judiciary act, or to abridge any of the admiralty
powers conferred upon the District Courts by the statute of 1789.
Its purpose, as avowed in its title, is "to extend the jurisdiction of
the District Couris ;" and it certainly cannot be so construed as to
limit and abridge an existing jurisdiction.
This interpretation and construction of the act of 1845, as to its
effect upon previous legislation, is amply sustained by authority.
When a statute gives a new remedy without impairing or denying
one.already known to the law, the rule is to consider it as cumulative, allowing either the new or the old remedy to be pursued. 15
Ohio R. 65; 3 Hill R. 41; 15 John. R. 222. To repeal a statute
by implication, it is not sufficient to establish that subsequent laws
cover some or even all the cases provided for by the prior law; for
they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary. But,
there must be a positive repugnancyJ, and even then the old law is
repealed only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy. 16 Peters
R. 362; 3 How. R. 646.
There is no repugnancy between the acts of 1789 and 1845.
Under the former law, the District Courts have jurisdiction of vessels under 20 tons burthen, whether enrolled and licensed or not, and
also of vessels employed in the foreign trade. And they have jurisdiction of those exceeding 20 tons burthen that are enrolled and
licensed, and engaged in navigation between different States, not
only by virtue and under the authority of the act of 1789, but also
by the act of 1845; and yet the rigt of the trial of facts put in
issue to a jury, is secured in all cases.
This we believe to be the true import and legal effect of the two
acts of Congress, when considered and construed together. We do
not intend or desire to enter upon a discussion of the constitutional
pomer of Congress to pass, and to make either of these laws operative upon the great lakes. Nor is it for us to sit in judgment upon
the merits of the controversy which, for many years, has engaged
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the members of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the
question of limiting the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts
to tide water. That controversy has been distinguished for great
ability and profound learning. It has been attended with all the
sensitiveness (and yet without any of the arrogance or acrimony)
which characterized the struggle for jurisdictioa in England between
the courts of common law and those of the admiralty and chancery, in the early part of the seventeenth century. We are well
satisfied witf the interpretation of the constitution, as to the extent
of the admiralty powers possessed by the general government,
which is now established by the mature. judgment of the Supreme
Court of the United. States; and it is enough to know, that the
case of The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson vs. Johnson et al., 12
Wheat., and The Orleans vs. Phcebus, 11 Peters, are overruled
eases, and that the doctrine maintained by the Supreme Court in
the cases of the Genesee Chief and steamboat Magnolia, fur-

nishes a rule of decision which is of paramount authority in all the
courts of the United States.
On the whole, we are of the opinion, that the admiralty jurisdiction of this court is rightfully exercised over the vessel seized in
this case, and that it is no valid objection to the jurisdidtion, that
the vessel, at the time of seizure, was not enrolled and licensed for
the coasting trade, or engaged in the business of commerce and
navigation between different States or Territories.
In the Court of Conmon Pleas of .Ramilton County, Ohio.
CHESTER BAXTER V8. WL F. AND EMILY A. ROBLOFSON,

1. Where a married woman executed a mortgage upon her separate property under
representations which were false and fraudulent, which mortgage would not have
been executed had such misrepresentation not been made, and at the same time
her husband made a negotiable promissory note which was secured by, and accompanied this mortgage, and such negotiable promissory note passes into the
hands of a liolder without notice for value, the wife may make a valid defence
to such note, because the mortgage is the principal debt, and the negotiable
paper is incident to it.
2. A mortgage is in no sense a security similar to a negotiable promissory note,
aud does allow the principles of law which apply to notes or bills to be applied
to it.
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3. A note which accompanies a mortgage is subsidiary to the mortgage, and cannot
be treated as an independent contract of itself.
4. A defence valid on the ground of fraud as between mortgagor and mortgagee
will be valid as between the mortgagor who is the maker of a negotiable note
secured by mortgage and an endorsee of such note, even though the latter be a
holder for value.
5. Reeves v. Scully, Walker's Ch. 248, and .Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chandler, 86, commented on.
6. Where a married woman mortgages her separate property to secure the notes of
her husband, and such mortgage is procured by misrepresentation, she may
defend against s, suit to foreclose, when it is attempted to charge the land with
the debt, when no defence would be open to her husband in an action against
him on the notes by an innocent holder for value.

COLLINS, J.-This is a suit to foreclose a mortgage made by defendant, May 27th, 1854, to secure ten notes, made by defendants,
William Roelofson, of same date, payable to the order of Cassius P.
Peck, and given to secure the payment of $10,000 five years after
date, with interest, payable semi-annually, at the rate of ten per
centum per annum.
William F. Roelofson makes no defence to the suit. His wife
files an answer by her next friend. The property mortgaged was
the separate property of Emily A. Roelofson, wife of. Win. F. Roelofson, whose notes were to be secured.
To her answer a demurrer is interposed; and the opinion of the
Court is required upon the following facts :-At the same time that
Mrs. Roelofson executed the mortgage in this suit, and as a part of
the same transaction, she executed eight other mortgages, to secure
other notes of her husband, amounting in the aggregate to $75,000,
all payable to .the order of C. P. Peck, and bearing ten per cent.
interest, and all the mortgages being upon her separate property.
The mortgages were duly recorded, and delivered with the notes
to Mr. Peck, -for the purpose of being taken to the East and sold,
for the benefit of Mr. Roelofson. The notes were sold and endorsed, and the mortgages assigned by Peck, and came into the
hands of plaintiff as a bona fide endorsee, or purchaser.
It is further alleged that Mrs. Roelofson was induced, by false
and fraudulent misrepresentations made by said Peck, to execute
all of said mortgages, to wit: That said Peck represented to her
that he intended to establish a banking business in partnership
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-with her husband, having a house in New York, and another in
Cincinnati, and that about $50,000 of the money to be raised on
said notes and mortgages, was to be put into said business, as her
husband's share of the capital; and that the balance of the prcceeds, to the amount of twenty, or not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars, was to be applied in liquidation of a debt which her
husband owed to the house of C. P. Peck & Co., in New York, as
his share of the loss in a disastrous corn speculation. Whereas the
fact wais, as Peck well knew, that the liability of her husband to the
firm of C. P. Peck & Co., of which said Peck was a member, was
fully equal to the whole amount of said notes, and her husband
being insolvent, Peck contrived this fraud to obtain security for her
husband's large indebtedness upon her separate property; and that
she would have made neither of said mortgages, except she had
believed that it would not only release her husband from all indebtedness, but furnish him also a capital of $50,000, or more, to
establish a banking husiness, and that she has never assented to
any other use of said notes and mortgages.
Now, upon this state of facts, I have no difficulty in declaring
that the defendant's mortgages were obtained from her by false and
fraudulent pretences; and, while in the hands of the mortgagee,
were totally void. The difficulty of the case arises from the fact,
that the mortgages Were made to secure negotiable promisory notes,

and, with the notes, have passed into the hands of holders without
notice and for a valuable consideration. No defence can be made
against the notes, and judgment must be given against W. F. Roelofson, maker. Can any defence be made by Mrs. Roelofson
against the enforcement of the lien created by the mortgages on
her separate property ? Is a mortgage negotiable so as to cut off
all equities between the original parties, when it is made to sicure
and accompany a negotiable instrument, and passes with that instrumentitxto the hands of an innocent holder?
It would seem, from the prevalence in our money market of mortgage notes, and their frequent sale, with an assignment of the
security, that this question must have been often raised, and that
the rights of the assignee of such mortgages must have been well
defined by adjudication. Yet, judging from failure of counsel on
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either side, after the most diligent research, to produce any wellconsidered decision upon the point, (and from such further examination, as in the pressure of other business, I have been enabled to
give,) I am without a well-considered precedent in the cases, or any
direct rule in the elementary treatises by which to be guided in my
decision. I must therefore treat the present case as one of first
impression; and being such, it is with a less degree of confidence
that I announce the conclusion to which I have arrived.
There is no difficulty in stating the general rule to be, that mortgages, as such, are not negotiable-they are mere choses in action
-- simply a right in the mortgagee to subject specific property to
the satisfaction of his debt. If he assigns his right, the assignee
takes it subject to all equities or matters of defence then subsisting
between him and the mortgagor. The books are full of cases showing all manner of defences which the mortgagor has been permitted
to make against the assignee. 1 Hilliard on Mortgages, 861, see.
50; 24 Pick. 221; 22 Pick. 231; 7 Vesey, 28.
Different practices have, however, prevailed in regard to the
mode of evidencing the debt secured; it being sometimes evidenced
only by a recital, acknowledging it in the clause of defeasance, in
the body of the mortgage.
But in New York, and other of the Eastern States, as well as in
England, the debt was commonly evidenced by a bond under seal;
the reason being, that while a mere note would outlaw in six years,
a bond would not be barred in less than fifteen. Hence in those
markets the common phrase is bonds and mortgages-andrarely if
ever, do we hear.of a note secured by mortgage. This will sufficiently account for the absence of adjudicated cases in those States.
It is, perhaps, more a Western custom, where seals to evidences, of
debt lend no additional sanctity, to make use of negotiable notes
and mortgages, and we shall see, the only two reported cases bearing upon the dire-ct question before us, are found, one in Michigan,
the other in Wisconsin.
If a mortgage, as such, becomes subject to the rules of negotiable
instruments, when made to secure a negotiable instrument-by
what reason or authority is it ? The debt is one thing, the pledging of specific land for its security, another. The contract for the
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pledge may not be made until long after the contract of the debt,
and it may be canceled long prior to the debt. It is true, the contract of pledge cannot exist prior to the debt, or after it. It is, in
other words, an incident to the debt, but not a necessary incident.
Because the debt is in negotiable form, must, therefore, the
pledge be also negotiable? . Must the incident, merely because it is
an incident partake of all the qualities of the principal ? The parasite cannot stand without the oak on which it climbs-if the oak
falls, it falls-yet, it is not, therefore, identical in character with
the oak. So is the power of attorney to confess judgment frequently an incident of a note, and a valuable incident too, springing into being at the same time, written on the same paper, and
incapable of life after the note is paid. Yet, our Supreme Court
has held that the power of attorney, attached to a note, and being
frequently part of the same contract, does not pass to the endorsee
of the note; is not negotiable. Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio 130.,
So a guaranty of payment, written by a third party on the back
of a note, or on a separate paper, though it may. be much the most
valuable thing about the note, doeg not even pass to the endorsee of
the note, unless there be express words of negotiability in the contract of guaranty, as distinct from the same words in the body of
the note. In other words the guarantor's contradt cannot be nego5 Wen-.
tiated unless it contain apt words to make it negotiable,
W/atv.
Mclaren
856;
24
Wend.
v.
Barnes,
dell, 307 ; Ke(chell
son's Ez'rs., 26 Wend. 425; Story on Bills, s6ec. 457; Chitty on
Bills, ch. 6, page 273; 2 Hill, 188.
In 5 Wendell, 308, Chief Justice Savage says: "Promissory
notes are negotiable only by virtue of the statute, but this negotiable quality is not extended to any other instrument relating to
the -note."
Indeed the quality of negotiability, by which a party to a contract is precluded from making any valid defence be may have
against the binding obligation on such contract, is peculiar to notes
and bills; and in several of the States even promissory notes do
not have that quality, though payable to order. It is in many
cases, even as to notes and bills, pro ductive of harsh results; but
31
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on the whole is of so great commercial necessity and convenience
as to have found a ready acceptance among mercantile classes in
England, even before the statute of 3d and 4th Anne, to have been
recognized now by positive legislation in nearly all the States, and
to be cheerfully, and even rigorously upheld in the courts.
I could not dare, however, to bring any other class of contracts
within the same rule, unless I clearly saw the same public necessity
for it-and even then, under the modern distribution of powers in
government, I should say it clearly belonged to the legislative department to first establish the rule.
It is observable that in every case of negotiability yet recognized
by the courts, the existence of two elements has been required.
First, it must appear that by the terms of the instrument the parties have themselves expressly undertaken to make it negotiable.
Secondly, the law must find the contract of the parties to be one to
which, for reasons of policy, it feels bound to give the legal effect
proposed by them. These two elements were distinctly recognized
in the early case of Girardv. La Costa, 1 Dallas, 215, to be the
grounds on which mercantile paper was clothed with the qualities
of negotiability. Judge Shippen said in that case: "To make bills
and notes assignable, the power to assign them must appear in the
instruments themselves; and then the custom of merchants, in the
cases of bills of exchange, and the act of Parliament, in the case
of notes, operating upon the contract of the parties, will make
them negotiable."
It is upon precisely the same grounds that the parties expressly
so undertook, and that the law found reasons of general policy for
sanctioning that undertaking, that guaranties of negotiable paper
have in certain cases been held to be negotiable. These principles
have hitherto been of universal application.
Neither of these elements exists here. the mortgagor has used
none of the expressions of promise which have been held by the
law to constitute a negotiable promise. The first and most important element is wanting. Is the second element here ? Is there
any such public necessity requiring a mortgage to be negotiable as
well as merdantile paper? The object as to such paper is to facilitate its transfer from hand to hand, its remittance by mail, or
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otherwise, to distant points, so that the party receiving it need not
stop the course of his business to inquire into its origin, and the
present relations of the original parties to it.
But dealings in mortgages do not admit of the same rapidity.
He who proposes to purchase must, if he act with any prudence,
pause sufficiently to ascertain that the mortgagor had a title,
whether the mortgage is executed in due form of law, and whether
it be a first, second or third lien. Mortgages are not intended,
like notes and bills, to form a part of the currency to be passed
from hand to hand. They are rather a means of permanent investment, and their purchase necessarily puts the purchaser to inquiry
and deliberation. It will add little to his inconvenience to require
of him also to ascertain from the mortgagor the subsisting relations
between him vnd the mortgagee.
We might say.that as a contract of guaranty on a note would be
negotiable, if it appeared to be the design of the parties to -make it
so, likewise would it be with a mortgage; and that When a party
makes his mortgage as security to a negotiable note, the plain
inference is that he intends the mortgage to be' negotiable also.
But as the Court of Errors in New York, in the cases cited, refused
to declare a guaranty negotiable by construction, and without.apt
words witnessing the intention of the guarantor, much less would I
feel disposed to infer negotiability for the more unwieldy mortgage.
It may also be said. that, it makes no difference to the obligor
whether he is precluded from defences on his mortgage or not, so
long as he is precluded from denying any part of the debt in a suit
on the note. And this .is ordinarily true. He must pay his debt
is not subjected to its payment under
at any rate, and if his land
t
the mortgage, it, as well as other of his property, is liable in exe-"
cution.
To this pturport is the citation from Powell on Mortgages, vol. 8,
page 908, note t, in which is expressed the opinion of the author
merely, that where a mortgage accompanies the negotiable note of
the mortgagor, it may be regarded as negotiable, because the assignee has a legal remedy which.a court of equity will not take away.
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That is, the mortgagor being liable, at all events, to pay the amount
of the note to the holder of the note and mortgage, a court of equity
will not permit him to evade the payment of an admitted debt by
withdrawing from it the security which he himself had appointed
for its payment.
Of the like purport is the case in 5 Barbour, 182, in which, it
having been already determined in a suit at law for the debt, that
the debtor, who had also made a mortgage, could not avoid payment of the debt on the ground of usury, and judgment had gone
against him. In a subsequent suit in equity for foreclosure of the
mortgage, the same defence being set up by the defendant, the
court said: "It is enough that he had an opportunity of trying the
question, and that matter has been adjudged against him."
So in Reeves vs. Scully, Walker's Oh., 248 ; Scully having made
his negotiable note, and a mortgage to secure it, they were assigned
by the mortgagee to the plaintiff. The suit was to foreclose the mortgage, and Scully attempted to defend on equities between him and
the mortgagee. The court said: "The decree must be entered for
the amount of the note and mortgage. Reeves, as bona fide endorsee of the note, was not affected by the equities existing between
maker and payee. It would have been otherwise if a bond instead
of a note had been given with the mortgage." No authorities are
cited to sustain the judge's opinion, and though it may seem to assert that the mortgage was negotiable because the note was, I am
unwilling to follow him to that extent.
But the case we have in hand is not the case where the maker of
a negotiable note. makes a mortgage on his own property to secure
that note. It seems to me to be quite another and a different case,
and to be outside of the equitable consideration governing the foregoing cases. Here the mortgagor makes her mortgage to secure
not her own debt but another's, and though the maker of the notes,
the debtor, may be precluded from all defences against the innocent
endorsee of the notes, yet it does not follow that his surety, who
makes her mortgage to secure his debt, shall be similarly affected.
He makes one contract, viz : to pay the debt; she another, viz : to
hold her property subject to the lien of the debt. His contract is
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negotiable, as containing apt words to make it so, and by special
authority of the statute as well as the law merchant; while her
contract contains no apt words to make it negotiable, and is nt
within the statute relating to negotiable instruments. No proof is
offered, either, of any custom among the merchants or others, by
which a contract of pledge is negotiable.
There may be, and I am inclined to think there is, among the
bar a prevalent notion that a mortgage made to secure a negotiable
note is itself negotiable in as full a sense as the note. Such was
my own impression before the argument of the present case, and it
has been with a good deal'of hesitation that I go counter to it.
Whence has such an impression sprung among the bar ? In analyzing my own ideas upon the subject, I find it was in my mind from
the force of the maxim-that the mortgage is an incident of the
debt, and follows the debt into whosoever hands it goes. The maxim
is undoubtedly correct and founded in good sense. In the leading
case establishing it, Martin vs. .Tkowlier, 2 Burr., 969, Lord Mansfield observed, with his usual vigor of expression: "A mortgage is
a charge upon the land, and whatever will give the money will carrj
the estate in the land along with it, to every purpo8e."
The same doctrine has been adopted in innumerable cases sin ei
and with no exception or qualification. Yet what are the cases ?
With a single exception, to be more particularly noticed, every one
of them, so far as I am aware, were cases in -which the question
simply was as between- the mortgagee and his assignee. Thus, the
mortgagee having transferred the debt, and Miade no formal transfer or-assignment of the mortgage, the question was whether an
assignment of the mortgage followed by construction of law. The
courts said certainly it did. It could do the mortgagee no good to
withhold the security after he had transferred the debt. - It would
simply be acting the part of the dog in the manger, and the law
would not presume that he intended so to act when he transferred
the evidence of the debt. It would presume that he intended at the
time to transfer also the security for the debt. Walker's Ch. 251;
5 New Hamp. 420 ; 8 Pick. 490 ; 4 Ohio, 320. Yet if, for reasons
subsisting between him and the mortgagor, he especially desired not
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to transfer the mortgage security, but the debt only, and so stipulated with the assignee of the debt, he might do so, and then the
debt would not take the security with it. 5 Cowen, 202.
Or, if in transferring the debt, it being evidenced by a negotiable
note, he also transferred the mortgage, but the latter with an express
stipulation that the transfer or assignment was subject to all equities subsisting between him and the mortgagor; that he might do.
Such reservation of the rights of the mortgagor was made in
Fishervs. Otis, 3 Chandler, 83, and the case really turned upon
that. Yet the court did also go further, though not necessary to
the conclusion in the case, and asserted all that is claimed by plaintiffs in this case. Hubbell, Judge, said: "The rule is well settled
that a mortgage is a mere incident to the note, and may be extinguished by its payment or passed by its transfer." This is all true
enough, but then he proceeds and says, that where the note is negotiable and passes into the hands of an innocent holder, the "mortgage, in such cases, would pass as an incident to the note, and might
be enforced by the holder, in spite of any existing equities between
the mortgagor and mortgagee. This doctrine is sustained by respectable *authorities, and by the reason and sound policy which
have long ruled in relation to commercial paper." The learned
judge did not, however, cite any authorities, respectable or otherwise, that sustained more than his first proposition, unless it be
Powell on Mortgages, vol. 3, page 908. This I have already
considered as not sustaining the doctrine as claimed. I have also
expressed my views upon the question of commercial policy as involved, and cannot, for the reasons stated, agree with Judge Hubbell in that case.
Nor does the maxim, that the mortgage is an incident to the debt,
seem necessarily to imply, as I have before said, that it partakes of
all the characteristics of the debt.
There is also another reason which seems entitled to weight in
this matter, when a third party makes a mortgage on his property
to secure the debt of another. In such case the mortgagor is a
mere surety, and as such is to be deprived of no right by implication. Unless his mortgageis clearly negotiable, and is obtained
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and used for the purpose represented, a court would not enforce the
lien.. 11 Maryland, 469; 16 Penn. St. 415; 3 Paige, 614;
3 Sandf. 135; 2 Story's Eq. 1373.
But supposing the foregoing views to be erroneous, there is still
another reason peculiar to this case, against giving any further effect
to the mortgage than its terms plainly import, namely, that it is
made by a married woman, by one who is competent in law to make
only a particular kind of contract, who could not by any possibility
make a bill or note or other negotiable instrument, who can ordinarily charge her land, only for some benefit actually received to
her estate, and who cannot even charge herself individually in debt.
Yale vs. Dederer et ux., 18 N. Y. Smith, 265.
If, in incumbering her lands in the only possible legal way for
her husband's benefit, viz: by the joint execution with him of a
mortgage in due form of law, she is defrauded into the act, in such
a manner as to make her mortgage totally void, as between her and
the mortgagee, would it not be an anomaly that the law should
force upon the mortgage, by analogy or implication merely, the
character of negotiable instruments, and say, that she should not
set up the fraud against the enforcement of the lien; provided the
mortgage had been transferred to one who knew nothing of tbe
fraud, but made no inquiry as to the good faith by which the mortgage was obtained?
Finally, taking the pleadings to be true, I conclude that this
mortgage was procured by false and frauduleiit representations; it
was therefore void ab initio. The mortgagee took no rights under
it, and could transfer none. The false representation that the money
was to be used in the main in establishing her husband in business,
with the concealment of the fact that he was hopelessly insolvent,
and that this large sum would no more than pay his indebtedness
to C. P. Peck & Co., seems to me to affect alike the whole consideration.
The demurrer to the answer is therefore overruled.

EAGON vs. CALL.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania-At Pittsburgh.
EAGON VS CALL.'

1. Where A sells B an unsound horse, and there is no express warranty, and no
fraud, the unsoundness of the animal amounts to neither want nor failure of consideration, and is no ground of defence against the payment of the price agreed
upon.
2. The rule of the civil law, that a sound price implies a warranty that the article
sold is sound, is not a rule of the common law.
3. It cannot be generally maintained, that where the buyer has had an opportunity
of examining the article, there is any engagement implied in the contract of sale,
that the seller warrants against latent defects, unknown alike to himself and to
the purchaser. Certainly there is no such engagement in the sale of such an
article as a horse.

Error to the Common Pleas of Greene county.
Sayers and Gapen, for plaintiff in error.
Lindsey and bguchanan, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The plaintiff sued upon a bill single, given to secure
the price of a mare, sold by him to the defendants. Among other
pleas, "want of consideration" for the bill was set up, and an
attempt was made to establish it by proof that the mare was
unsound at the time of sale. It was in refereice to this defence
that the learned judge of the Court of Common Pleas instructed the
jury, that "to. make a defence against the payment of the note, it
was not necessary to establish the fact that Eagon (the plaintiff)
knew the mare was unsound. If unsoundness is made out, then the
consideration of the note has failed, and on this equitable ground
the defendant will be released from the paynient of it." The instruction thus given is assigned for error. It is to be observed that it
does not put the defence upon the ground of fraud in the contract,
nor of express warranty by the vendor, but exclusively upon the
bad quality of the thing sold. Now, that the unsoundness of the
I We are indebted to the Pittsburgh Legal Journal for this case.-Ed. Am. L. Reg.
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article sold amounts neither to want or failure of consideration, is
easily demonstrable. Want of consideration can only be where the
promisee parts with nothing in exchange for the promise. The
consideration fails when the promiser does not get that which the
promisee agreed to give as a motive for the promise. But in the
absence of warranty, the soundness or unsoundness of the subject
matter of the sale has nothing to do with the consideration. There
is no relation of confidence between the buyer and the seller. In
the absence of agreement by the seller, the purchaser takes at his
own risk as to quality. The vendor of a chattel warrants th6 title,
and, in some cases, the species, but nothing more, consequently
when the title passes, the vendee has all that, under the contract of
sale, the vendor engaged to give him, and therefore, the entire consideration for his promise. There is, then, no failure. The rule of
the civil law, that a sound price implies a warranty that the article
sold is Bound, is not a'rule of the common law. I am not now speaking of cases of sale by sample, nor of cases in which the law is said
to imply a warranty that the goods sold are the same in specie with
those mentioned in the contract of sale. Borrekins vs. Bevan,
3 Rawle 37, is one of the latter, though even these cases are, perhaps,
rather adjudications of what shall be considered evidence of an
express engagement, than extensions of the doctrine of implied
warranty. There are "also to be found decisions in which it has been
held that thelaw implies in the case of a sale of goods by a manufacturer
that they are of a merchantable quality, and other decisions ruling
that where goods are sold for a particular use, there is an implied
warranty that they are fit for that use. But it cannot be generally
maintained that when the buyer has had an opportunity of examining the article, there is any engagement implied in the contract
of sale, that the seller warrants against latent defects, unknown alike
to himself and to the purchaser. Certainly there is no such engagement in the sale of such an article as a horse. The civil law doctrine would produce endless embarrassments, if applied to the
extended operations of modern trade. It always involves an inquiry
into 'the question whether the price agreed to be paid was or was
not a sound price, and, of course, leaves the measure of obligation
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of the contract to be determined by the jury. But if there be no
such engagement by the vendor, then the buyer, who has got an
unsound or defective article cannot assert that he has failed to
obtain all that for which he has contracted to pay. Mere inadequacy of consideration, without warranty, or fraud, is no defence to
the payment of a bill or note, given for the purchase money of goods,
and the unsoundness or defective quality of the article sold relates
only to the inadequacy of the consideration.
There was error, therefore, in the instruction given to the jury
by the court below. If the contract of sale was not fraudulent; if
there was no deceit on the part of plaintiff, to which knowledge by
him of the defect was essential, and if there was no express warranty, the
fact that the mare was unsound constituted no defence to the action.
It is unnecessary to notice the second and third assignments of
error, in detail. W hat we have already said is sufficient to express
our views of them.
The judgment is reversed and a venire de novo is awarded.
In the Supreme Gourt of Pennsylvania--At Harrisburg.
THE NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON TELEGRAPH

COMPANY VS.

ANDREW

DRYBURG.
1. It is the duty of the Telegraph Company to transmit the messages just as they
are delivered to them. Should they not do so, they will be liable for any loss
that may ensue by the wrong transmission.
2. Telegraph Compm.ics, like other corporations, may be sued in their corporate
character, for damages ariing from neglect of duty.
3. Where Ihe sender of a telegraphic message wrote "two hund bouquets," meaning two hand bouquets, and the agent of the Telegraph Company translated it
"two hundred" bouquets, and so delivered the message to the person addressed,
by which error he caused loss and damage: Telld, that the person to whom the
erroneous message was sent, could maintain an action in his own name, and that
the company were liable for the loss or damage caused by such error in transmitting.
4. Query, whether the Telegraph Company should not be regarded as the agent of
both the sender of and the person to whom the dispatch is addressed.
5. A servant, as such, cannot be charged for neglect, but the principal shall be
charged for it; but for a misfeasance an action will well lie against the servant.

.rror to the District Court of Philadelphia.
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Dryburg sued the Telegraph Company to recover damages occasioned by their negligent transmission of a.message sent to him
from New York by Mr. Le Roy. The message in question was (in
brief) an order to plaintiff (who is a florist) to send to New York,
" two hand bouquets." The message was erroneously sent over the
wires by the operator, and was delivered by the company to Mr.
Dryburg, "send two hundred bouquets."
The message calling for two hundred bouquets, (and two additional ones) was received by the plaintiff below from the boy
employed by the Telegraph Company, between two and three o'clock
on the afternoon of Monday, 26t of November, and the counterorder explaining the blunder did not arrive until after one o'clock
in the afternoon of the 27th, so that during that interval of time
between the reception of the blundering message and the delivery
of the corrected one, Mr. Dryburg had not only cut all the flowers
in his own green houses, but had purchased in other directions, about
$200 worth of flowers, on this order.
The facts, as disclosed by the evidence, appeared to be these.
Robert Le Roy, a resident of New York, came to the office of the
Telegraph Company in that city, on Monday, the 26th November,
1855, and left with the clerk, for transmission for him to Andrew
Dryburg, a florist in Philadelphia, a message written as follows:
"Send me, for Wednesday evening,, two hund bouquets, very handsome, one of five and one of ten dollars ;" and paid forty cents for
telegraphing it. In the message as received .at Philadelphia, the
words "two hund bouquets," read "two hundred bouquets," and
was so delivered to Mr. Dryburg. On the same day, Mr. Dryburg inquired of Mr. Le Roy, by telegraph, "are the two hundred bouquets intended for pyramids; are the five and ten dollar for the table or hand ?" and he received from.r. Le Roy, the
same evening, the following reply: "I wrote simply two hand bouquets, and not two hundred. I want two bouquets for the handone at five, and the other at ten dollars."
The declaration contained three counts. In the first of them it
isaverred that the plaintiff carries on the business of a florist, in
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Philadelphia, and that the defendants are engaged in transmitting
messages, by means of the magnetic telegraph, from New York to
Philadelphia, for reward; that on the 26th of November, 1855,
Robert Le Roy, delivered a message or order to the defendants at
New York, and paid the price for transmission and to be communicated by the telegraph to the plaintiff at Philadelphia, in these
words: "New York, November twenty-sixth. Send me for Wednesday evening two hand bouquets, very handsome, one of five and one
of ten dollars," and subscribed his name. That it was the duty
of the defendants to transmit and communicate the message or order
to the plaintiff correctly and faithfully, yet they did not so transmit
and communicate it, but, on the contrary, did carelessly and erroneously transmit it, and trafismitted and communicated to the plaintiff a different message, in these words: "New York, November
twenty-sixth. Send me on for Wednesday evening two hundred
bouquets, very handsome, one of five and one of ten dollars ;" by
reason of which he suffered damage.
In the second count it is averred, that a certain message was, at
the date aforesaid, delivered to the defendants in New York, and by
them accepted, and the price paid, for transmission and delivery to
the plaintiff at Philadelphia, but that the defendants did not, nor
would not transmit or communicate the said message to the plaintiff,
but on the contrary did transmit and communicate the same to the
plaintiff, erroneously, untruly and carelessly, by reason of which he
suffered damage.
In the third count it is also averred, that a'certain "message was
delivered to the defendants at New York, and by them accepted,
and the price paid, for transmission and delivery to the plaintiff
at Philadelphia, and that it was the duty of the defendants so to
transmit -and communicate it correctly and faithfully, but that the
defendants, in disregard of their duty, transmitted and communica-ted the said message to the plaintiff erroneously, untruly and carelessly, whereby he suffered damage.
The defendants pleaded not guilty. The cause was tried on the
5th of January, 1859, and verdict rendered for the plaintiff, for one
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hundred dollars, subject to the point of law, whether upon the whole
of the evidence he was entitled to recover.
Cruillou, for plaintiff.
T. S.. Price,for defendant.
WOODWARD, J.-The Telegraph Company did not send Le Roy's
communication as he wrote it. If written as the Company's agent
read it, the word hand was written hund, and if the Company had
sent the word hund to Dryburg, they would have been in no fault.
Their agent, however, assumed that hundred was meant, and accordingly added the three letters, r e d, which did all the mischief.
We do not understand that there was any dot after the letters
hund, to indicate a contraction, so that the agent's inference that
"hundred" was the word, was entirely gratuitous.
The wrong then, of which plaintiff complains, consisted in sending
him a different message from that which they had contracted 'with
Le Roy to send. That it was wrong is as certain as that it was
their duty to transmit the message for which they were paid.
Though telegraph companies are not, like carriers, insurers for the
safe delivery of what is entrusted to them, their obligations, as far
as they reach, spring from the same sources-the public nature of
their employment and the contract under which the peculiar duty is
assumed. One of the plainest of their obligations, is to transmit the
very message prescribed. To follow copy, an imperative law of -the
printing office, is equally applicable to the telegraph office. But
when they violate this duty, whether negligently or 'wilfully, are
they responsible to the party to whom the erroneous message is
addressed? That is the exact question upon this record. That
the defendants would be responsible to Le Roy, and that he would
be responsible over to Dryburg, are not contested, though perhaps
not conceded points, but that the Company are liable to Dryburg is
resisted on several grounds.
In the first place, it is said that the case belongs to that class of
torts in which malice is the gist of the action.
This is a mistake. The law lays the duty to transmit the mes-
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sage as it was received, and assigns as the breach that it was transmitted "erroneously, untruly and carelessly." No malicious intent
was alleged, nor was it necessary that one should be alleged or
proved. It is enough that negligence is charged and proved.
It is.settled upon abundant authority that incorporated companies may be sued in their corporate character for damages
arisinj fron neglect of duty and for trover. Ohitty's Plg, 68,
Turnpike Co. vs. Butter, 4 S. & R. 6; Fowle vs. Te Common
Council of Alexandria, 3 Peters, 409 ; Bushel vs. Ins. (o., 15 S.
& R. 178. And a corporation is liable in tort for the tortious act
of its agent, though the appointment of the agent be not under
seal, if the act be done in the ordinary service. Smith vs. Birmningham Gas Light Co. 1 Adol. & Ellis, 526.
Apart, however, from corporation law, it is said, in the next
place, that, upon the general principles of agency, the company can
be held answerable to Le Roy only. That the relation of principal
and agent existed between him and the company, there can be no
doubt, but I do not think it equally clear that that relation was not
established between Dryburg and the company. Telegraph companies are in some sort public institutions-open alike to all-and
are largely used in conducting the commerce of the country. The
banks decline to act upon their authority, and, doubtless, individuals may also decline, but, when a man receives a message at the
hands of the agent of such a company, and does act upon it, especially if, as Dryburg did, he used tle same medium for responding
to the message, it seems reasonable that, for all purposes of liability,
the telegraph company shall be considered as much the agent of him
who receives, as of him who sends the message. In point of fact,
the fee is often paid on delivery, and I am inclined to think the
company ought to be regarded as the common agent of the parties
at either end of the wire.
But, however this may be, regarding the company as alone the
agent of the sender of the message, is it to be doubted that an agent
is liable for misfeasance even to third parties? For nonfeasance, I
agree, the agent is responsible only to his employer, because there is
no privity of consideration. betwixt the agent and a third party.
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The remedy in such cases must be sought in the maxim respondeat
superior. But even to this rule there is an exception in the instance
of masters of ships, who, although they are the agents or servants
of the owners, are, also, in many respects deemed to be responsible
as principals to third persons, not only for their own negligence and
nonfeasance, but for those of subordinate officers, and others employed
under them. The general rule, however, was laid down by Lord
Holt,in Lane vs. Sir Robert Cotten, 12 Mod. R. 485, in these words :
"A servant or deputy, as such, cannot be charged for neglect, but
the principal only shall be charged for it; but for a misfeasance an
action will lie, against a servant or deputy, but not as a deputy or
servant but as a wrong doer." S. 0. 1 Lord Raymond, 646. The
compilers have taken the rule from this source, and the cases cited
by them show that it has generally been followed. See Paley on
Agency, p. 396, et. seq., and Story on Agency, sections 808, 809,
814 and 315, and the cases in notes.
The case of Camp vs. The Western Union Telepraph Co., 6 Am.
Law Register, 443, does not affect this principle as we apply it here;
for, there the action was by the sender of the message, and it
appeared that the message was sent, subject to the express condition
that defendant would not be liable for mistakes arising from any
cause, unless the message was repeated by being sent back.
This company had such a rule, also; but they charge 50 per cent.
advance upon the usual price of transmission, where the sender
demands that the message be repeated back to the first operator,
and Le Roy did not pay it. If it be granted that in consequence
of his not purchasing this security against mistakes, he could not
hold the company liable, it does not follow that Dryburg cannot.
He did not know whether the message had been repeated back to
Le Roy or not. He received it as the company delivered it to him,
and it is very material to observe that the mistake was not due to
what has been called the infirmities of telegraphing, but to the
improper liberties which the operator took with the text before him.
The magic power which presides over the wires performed its duty
faithfully, and bore the very message it was bidden to bear, but the
human agent sent a different message from that which he was commanded to send. This is the misfeasance the plaintiff complains of.
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The company claimed that their operator was a skillful and careful one. Then his negligence in this instance was the more apparent und inexcusable. If the handwriting was so bad he could not
read it correctly, he should not have undertaken to transmit it; but
the business of transmission assumed, it was'very plainly his duty
to-send what was written. It was no affair of his that the message
would have been insensible. Messages are often sent along the wires
that are unintelligible to the operator. When he presumed to translate the writing- and to add letters which confessedly were not in it,
he made the company responsible to Dryburg, for the damages that
resulted from his wrong doing.
We do not conceive it necessary to go any farther in the discussion of this case. There .are several errors assigned to which we
have not specially allude4, but we see nothing in them to require a
reversal of the judgment. Judgment affirmed.
In the Supreme Court of Texas-Austin Term, 1860.
THOMPSON ET AL.,

APPELLANTS vs. ORAGG ET AL., APPELLEES.

CRAGG ET AL. , APPELLANTS VS. SMALLEy ET AL., APPELLEES. 1

1.

Under the Spanish jurisprudence and the principles of the laws of the Republic
and State of Texas, the interests of the husband and the wife in the community
property are severed by the death of eitfier spouse, and the interest of the
deceased partner vests at'once in his or her heirs, subject only to the community
debts.
2. Where the husband, (in Texas) after the death of his wife, (leaving children
surviving) contracted to sell the community property and executed a bond for
1 DiGEST oF THe SUBxCTs DISCUSSs.:-1. Spanish law as to power of surviving spouse to .dispose of the community property. 2. Three years Statute of
Limitation of Texas. 3. Difference, under three years statute of Texas, between
title and color of title discussed.
4. Partition-good faith-improvements.
5. Coverture and Limitation. 6. Panand vs. Jones, : Cal. R. 448, reviewed at

length and held to be erroneous.
We publish this case at-the request of some esteemed correspondents in Texas,
who assure us that the questions discussed are of great magnitude and importance
in that State and in California. The opinion of the learned judge is certainly
'marked by ability, and will not fail to command the attention of the profession in
those sections of the union to which itis peculiarly applicable.-Eds. Am. Law Bet.
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title, a decree, after his death, in a suit for specific performance of the bond
brought against such children, as "the heirs of their deceased father" is only
binding on them in that capacity, and will not divest their interest in such community property, as the heirs of their deceased mother.
3. Nor will a commissioner's deed, made in pursuance of such decree, vesting in
the purchaser all the rights of the plaintiffs "as heirs of their deceased father,"
be a sufficient title or color of title to support the plea of the statute of limitations of the State of Texas of three years, and defeat their right to a recovery
in a suit brought by them as heirs of their deceased mother.
4. In suits for partition in Texas, where there is no dispute as to the title, the
equities between the parties, growing out of improvements and ameliorations,
can be adjusted by the court, with the aid of the commissioners appointed for
that purpose.
5. But in cases like the present, where questions of title and good faith are
involved, it is the right of the defendant, under our statute, to have the question
of good faith submitted to the jury, and it is theirfurther right to have the value
of their permanent and valuable improvements assessed by a jury, and secured to
them in the ultimate partition.
6. The proper and most convenient mode to do this, is to submit to the jury
issues respecting the value of the different tracts claimed by the defendants,
respectively, with and without improvements.
7. The court below properly excluded from the jury, evidence to the effect that
the surviving father was a poor man, and that the community property was sold
for the support of the family. To uphold sales of this character on such
grounds, would withdraw the most important rights from the control of judicial
tribunals, and wave them to the capricious inclinations of individuals.
b. Where a female under the age of twenty-one years, is married in accordance
with the laws of this state, (quoted in the opinion,) she is deemed of full age,
and the statute of limitations commences to run against her from the time of her
marriage.
U. The case of White vs.. Laftimer, 12 Tex. 61, in this latter point, reviewed and
affirmed.
10. After the death of the husband or wife, the surviving spouse, under the
Spanish law, had no right to sell the whole of the community property, but onehalf thereof descends presently to the heirs, subject only to the community debts..
11. The case of Pannand vT. Jones, 1 California Reports, p. 448, maintaining the
contrary doctrine, fully discussed and considered, in connection with the Spanish
law on the subject, and held to be in direct conflict with that law.

Error from Williamson county.
BELL, J.-I will state, as preliminary matter, a few of the leading
facts of this case, that the opinion may be the more easily understood.

498

THOMPSON ET AL. vs. CRAGG ET AL.

Prior A. Holder emigrated to Texas in the year 1838. He was
a married man, and received a grant of a league and labor of land,
as a colonist.
The league of land was located on Brushy Creek by Thomas
Kinney, who received one-half of it for locating, surveying, &c.
Julia Holder, the wife of Prior A. Holder, died in December, 1836,
leaving two children, William Holder, who was born in October,
1832, and Martha Jane, now Mrs. Cragg, who was born in December, 1835.
William Holder, the son of Prior A. and Julia Holder, married
Eliza Yandever, and died in April, 1856, leaving the said Eliza a
widow without children. Martha Jane, the daughter of Prior A.
and Julia Holder, mariied Richard Cragg, on the 31st day of
August, 1852.
On the 24th of April, Prior A. Holder sold the remaining half
of his head-right league of land to W. D. Thompson & Co., and
executed a bond for title.
Prior A. Holder died in November, 1837, leaving no children
but William and Martha Jane.
In March, 1847, W. D. Thompson and 0. B. Smith, instituted
suit in the District Court for Bastrop County, on the bond executed
by Prior A. Holder to W. D. Thompson & Co. 'Uhis suit was
against Thomas H. Mays, who was the administrator of Prior A.
Holder's estate, and against the minor children of Prior A. Holder,
namely: William and Martha Jane. In this suit there was personal
service on the minors. Thomas H. Mays was appointed their guardian ad litem. -On the trial Mays answered, confessing the allegation
of the petition of Thompson & Smith, and the court rendered judgment, appointing commissioners to partition the head-right league
of Prior A. Holder, and to set apart to said Thompson & Smith
one-half of it; and also appointing a special commissioner to execute
to the said Thompson & Smith a deed to the half so set apart to
them by the commissioners, which deed should convey to the said
Thompson & Smith "all the interest that the heirs of the said
Prior A. Holder may have had in and to the lands so set apart."
The commissioners appointed by the court divided the land and
made their report on the 22d day of October, 1847. Preston Cowlee,
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the special commissioner appointed for the purpose, executed a deed
to Thompson & Smith, in conformity with the previous decree of the
District Court for Bastrop county, at Bastrop. This suit was instituted on the 11th day of February, 1857, by Martha Jane Cragg,
and her husband Richard Cragg, and Eliza Holder, the widow of
William Holder, against Freeman Smalley, and many other defendants. Thompson was made a party by am6ndment filed 17th of
March, 1858.
Martha Jane Cragg sues for her interest in the land as heir of
her mother, Julia Holder, and as entitled to a portion of the interest
of her deceased brother, William Holder, which he inherited from
his mother Julia. Eliza Holder sues for the interest to which she
is entitled as the surviving wife of William Holder. During the
pendency of the suit, Eliza Holder intermarried with John R. Hubbard, who joined her in the suit as a party plaintiff. The original
petition was in the form of an action of trespass to try title, the
plaintiffs claiming the whole of the half league of land. The defendants pleaded the statute of limitations in all of its various provisions. They also pleaded title in themselves for nineteen years, the
staleness of the demand of the plaintiffs, and valuable improvements made in good faith. By the amended petition, filed March
17th, 1858, the plaintiffs set out the facts upon which their claim of
title rested, limited their claim to half of the half of the half league,
and asked for partition between themselves and.the defendants in
possession.
The defendants all claim under the sale by Prior A. Holder to
Thompson & Smith, the decree of the District Court of Bastrop
county, and the deed of the commisioner, Preston Cowlee, made
in pursuance of the decree. On the trial of the cause in the court
below, the court treated the suit as one for partition only; arrested
the defendants in the introduction of evidence of the value of their
improvements, and excluded all evidence in relation to the value of
the improvements from the consideration of the jury.
The instructions given by the court to the jury were, in some
respects, contradictory, owing doubtless to the face, that many instructions were asked by the parties which the court did not take
time sufficiently to scrutinize.
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In what appears to be the general charge given by the judge, of his
own motion, the jury were told, that the decree of the District
Court of Bastrop county might be looked to by them as one of the
links of a title or color of title, as those terms are used in the three
years statute of limitations.
He instructed them particularly in reference to the statute of
limitations of three years and of five years.
The judge also gave tht sixth instruction asked by the plaintiffs,
(in connection with others asked by them,) which was to the effect
that under the title presented by the defendants, it would be necessary for them to show five years uninterrupted and peaceable possession, using, cultivating, and paying taxes on the land, and that if
they failed to show all those circumstances, the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover the land.
The plaintiffs then asked the court to instruct the jury that the
statute of limitation of three years was not applicable to the title
offered in evidence by the defendants, except as to the interest of
Prior A. Holder in the land. This charge was refused by the
court. The court then instructed the jury, at the request of the
defendants Freeman Smalley and those claiming under him, that
if they found from the testimony, that Freeman Smalley was in pos-.
session under title or color of title for three years from the time the
cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs before the 11th of February,
1857, they would find for said Smalley and those claiming under
him, to the extent of the boundaries in the deed from Smith &
Thompson to Freeman Smalley. The court also instructed the
jury, at the request of said Smalley, and those claiming under him,
that the decree of the District Court of Bastrop county, and the deed
of the commissioner, made in pursuance of said decree, constituted
color of title as contemplated in the three years statute of limitation. At the request of the other defendants, the court instructed
the jury that the decree of the District Court for Bastrop county,
and the conveyances under it, were good title and color of title, to
support the plea of the statute of limitations of. three years as to
all of the defendants who had possession under said decree and conveyances before the commencement of the suit; and that the statute
of limitations began to run as to Martha Jane Cragg, from the day
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of her marriage, and against William Holder, from the time of his
becoming twenty-one years of age; that the statute did not cease
to run until the commencement of the suit, and so far as the defendants were in possession, three years from the date of the marriage
of Martha Jane Cragg, and from the time William Holder became
twenty-one years of age, they were protected by the statute of limitation of three years.
There were other instructions given and refused, not necessary
to be particularly noticed here. Upon a view of all the instructions given and refused by the court, it is obvious that the court
below was of opinion that the decree of the District Court of Bastrop county, and the deed made in pursuance of it, only affected
the rights of the children of Prior A. Holder as his heirs, and that
they did not affect their rights as heirs of their mother Julia Holder.
But the court was at the same time of opinion, that the decree and
commissioner's deed constituted such color of title as would support
a possession of three years under the appropriate plea.
As our opinion will lead to a reversal of the judgment of the
court below, I shall proceed to state as succinctly as possible, and
without any extended discussion, wherein we believe the court below
to have erred, and wherein our opinion coincides with the viewswhich it is plain were entertained by that court.
In the first place we are of opinion, that the decree of the District Court of Bastrop county only concluded the rights of the
children of Prior A. Holder in the half leagu'e of land, so far
as they were entitled through him, and that it did not affect the
interest which they had in the land as heirs of their deceased
mother, Julia Holder.
It is contended by the counsel for those parties who were defendants in the court below, that the children of Julia Holder ought
to be, in all respects, concluded by the decree of the District Court
of Bastrop county, because they were parties to it, ahd because
the question of Prior A. Holder's right to sell the whole of the land,
was a question which might have been adjudicated in the Bastrop
suit. The object of the suit in the District Court of Bastrop
county was simply to have the bond of Prior A. Holder carried
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into effect; and nothing more can be claimed for the decree than
was asked in the suit. The minor children of Prior A. Holder
were parties to the suit as the heirs of Prior A. Holder, and in
that capacity only.
Let us suppose that Prior A. Holder had not been dead, and that a
sui thad been brought against him on the bond for specific performance.
It will not be pretended, that a decree vesting all his right, title
and interest in the land in Thompson & Smith, would have affected
the interest of his children as heirs of their mother; and yet, in
the case supposed, the question of Prior A. Holder's right to sell
the whole land, would have been as much involved, as it could possibly have been in the suit, the effects of which we are now considering. Nor can the proposition be maintained that the minors were
in all respects concluded by the decree, because they were parties
to it. I
To state this proposition in another form, would be to say, that
the heirs of A being also the heirs of B, are affected in their
rights as the heirs of A by a decree against them as the heirs of
B, when their rights as the heirs of A were not involved .in any
way in the suit in which the decree was rendered.
let it be borne in mind in the case before us, that the legal
status of the minors, William and Martha Jane, as the heirs of their
father, was something entirely distinct from their legal status as the
heirs of their mother, just as the estate of their mother in the headright league of land, was after her death, a legal status entirely
distinct from the estate of their father, in the same league of land.
I will put a case, which, I think, will set the matter in a clear light.
Let us suppose that when Prior A. Holder and Julia Holder intermarried, each of them had two children born of former marriages.
With these children let us suppose them to have emigrated to
Texas, and acquired a head-right league of iand. Let us suppose
thfe mother to die, leaving her two children by a former marriage,
having borne no children to her last husband. Let us suppose
Holder, after his wife's death, to sell the league of land and give
bond for title, and afterwards to die, leaving his two children the
fruit of his first marriage. Let us suppose that suit is instituted
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against his adminstrator, that his two children are made parties,
that a specific performance of the bond'is asked, and a decree rendered, vesting in the obligee in the bond, all the right, title and
interest of Holder and his heirs in the league of land. Would the
heirs of Mrs. Holder be in any way affected by all this ? Certainly
not. No more can the heirs of Mrs. Holder be affected by this
Bastrop decree, for the case last stated and the case now before us
are the same.
We are of opinion that the decree of the District Court of Bastrop
county, and the commissioner's deed, and the subsequent conveyances to the defendants, which were in evidence on the trial, do not
constitute such title or color of title, as will support the plea of the
statute of limitation of three years. These muniments do not constitute title, because, as has already been -said, the Bastrop decree
did not touch the interest of the heirs of Julia Holder as such in
the land. Nor can *therebe color of title, as defined by the statute,
where there is a complete hiatus in the chain. Color of title differs
from title only in externals. The substance of both is the same.
Were this not so, if color of title were something intrinsically and
substantially less or weaker than title, then the wisdom df the legislature could not be vindicated, in applying the same peripd of
limitation to a possession supported by the one, as is applied to a
possession supported by the other.
* The shortest period of limitation of which the defendants could
avail themselves in the support of the title exhibited in evidence, is
five years. We are of opinion that the defendants exhibited such
muniments of title as secured to them the right to have the question
of the good faith of their possession, and the value of their improvements, submitted to the jury.
The suit could not be properly treated as a suit for partition only.
The main question between the parties was the question of title. In
suits for partition, where there is no controversy about the title, the
equities between the parties, growing out of improvements and
ameliorations, may be settled by the court with the aid of commissioners appointed for that purpose. But in a case like the present,
where the question of good faith is involved, it is the right of the
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defendants to have that question determined. And if their possession be found to be in good faith, then, it is their further right to
have the value of their permanent and valuable improvements
ascertained by the jury, and secured to-them in the ultimate partition. These questions, concurring the value of improvements in a
case like the present, can be most conveniently disposed of by submitting issues to the jury respecting the value of the different tracts
claimed by the defendants respectively, with and without the improvements. We are of opinion that the court did not err in rejecting the
evidence offered, that Prior A. Holder was a poor man, unable to work
for his children ; that the sale of the land was necessary for the support of his children, &c. This court has never gone so far as to
decide that the surviving father or mother could sell that portion
of the community property which vested in the heirs of the deceased
partner, for the support of the family; and to uphold sales upon such
grounds would be to withdraw the most important rights from the
control of those tribunals authorized by law to guard and protect
them, and to commit them to the capricious inclinations of individuals.
The record discloses the fact that Martha Jane Holder, now Mrs.
Cragg, married'in 1852, being about seventeen years of age at the
time of her marriage. It is argued by her counsel that the statute
of limitation did not commence to run against her until she attained
the age of twenty-one years, and we are asked to reconsider the
decision of this court upon the point in the case of White vs. Latimer,
12 Tex. 61. It is contended that our statute, (Art. 2420 of Hart.
Digest,) which provides that "every female under the age of twentyone years, who shall marry in accordance with the laws of this
State, shall from the time of and after such marriage be deemed to
be of full age, and shall have all the rights and privileges to which
she would have been entitled had she been at the time of marriage
of full age," was intended to endow females who should marry
under.the age of twenty-one years, with all the capacities, rights
and privileges of persons of full age, but not to deprive them of any
advantages they might claim by reason of nonage. The statute
will not admit of this construction. The language used, "shall be
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deemed to be of full age," we think, must be taken to mean that the
person spoken of shall be deemed to be of full age for all purposes.
The position was assumed in the court below, and has also been
taken in this court, that under the Spanish law in force at the time
when Prior A. Holder sold the land in controversy to Thompson &
Smith, he had the right to sell the whole of the land after the death
of his wife. And we are referred to the case of Panandvs. Jones,
1 California Rep. 488, where the proposition is distinctly and
emphatically asserted, "that by the law of Spain, one half of the
community property did not vest in the children of the marriage,
upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of one of the
spouses; but that the common property, not one half, but the
whole, was a security for the payment of debts contracted for
the common benefit, and also by the husband after the death of
the wife; and that neither the heirs of the wifg nor of the
husband have any interest, except in that portion which remains
after the payment of such debts." I think it proper to notice the
position assumed, and the case of _Panand vs. Jones; not because
the question involved is an open one, but because the sources of
the learning, by which the soundness of the propositions asserted in
the case referred to -must be tested are not accessible to every
member of the profession, and because upon a question so fundamental in the Spanish jurisprudence in relation to community property, we are not willing that there should be any room for doubt
as to the correctness of the former decision of this court.
The judge who delivered the opinion in the case of Panandv.
Jones, was misled by detached passages of commentations, which
doubtless came under his consideration disconnected from the
great body of the Spanishlaw on the subject with which the passages referred to are not at variance. He also misunderstood the
scope and meahing of the 14th law of Toro.
That law is calculated to mislead when considered by itself. It
is expressed in the following terms:
"Mandamos yue el marido y la munger, suello el matrimonio
dun que caren segunda o tercera viz: o mas, pueden disponer libremente de los bienes multiplicados durande el primero, o segunda, o
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tercero matrimonio amuque haya ha bido bijos de los tales matrimonio o alzunas de ellos, durande los cuales matrimonios los dictos
bienes se multiplicaron : Como de los otros sus bienes proprios yue
no orisen seido de guarrancia, sui tel obligados a reservar a los
tales hijos, propriedad in usufructo de los tales bienes." Which may
be translated thus : "We command, that the husband and the wife,
after the dissolution of the marriage, although they may marry a
second or a third time or more, may dispose freely of the property
accumulated during the first marriage, or second or third marriage,
although there may be children of such marriages or some of
them, during which marriages the said property was accumulated,
as of their other individual property which is not ganancial, without
being under any obligations to reserve to such children, either such
property itself or the usufruct of it."
This 14th law of Toro means only, that upon the dissolution of
the marriage, the surviving husband or wife may dispose of their
portion of their ganancialproperty; but it does not mean that the
surviving husband or wife could freely dispose of the whole of the
ganancial property, and it was never so understood by any commentator or by any judicial tribunal of the country, in which it wis
promulgated. This 14th law of Toro was declared with particular
reference to other principles and provisions of the Spanish law,
which are said by some of the Spanish commentators to have been
inherited, and which obviously were inherited by the Spaniards from
the Romans.
There were certain classes and kinds of property which were said
to be acquired by the husband and wife by lucrative title (por titulo
lucrativo) and in respect to which it was provided, that in the event
of the dissolution of the marriage, during which such property was
acquired, and the entrance of the survivor of the first marriage into
a second marriage, such survivor was under obligation to reserve
such property, so acquired by lucrative title during the first marriage, to the children of the first marriage. See leg. 14, titulo 2,
libro 4 of the Fuero Tuzgo. See also leg. 13 of the same title of
the same book of the same Fucro.
The 14th law of the 2d title of the fourth book of the Fuero
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Tuz. 90, provided that the mother should inherit jointly with the
children and in equal parts the property of her husband, but in the
form of usufruct only, and that in case she contracted a second
marriage, she should lose the usufruct. The 13th law of the Fuero
Tuzgo, provided, that when one of the parents died, the survivor
acquired the estate from the children in respect to the usufruct
only. Leg. 1, tit. 2, libro 4 del Fuero Real, provided, that the
mother is obliged to reserve for his children three-fourths (las tres
partres) of the arras which she received from her husband, and if
she ha& children of two marriages, the children of each marriage
should inherit the arras received from their respective fathers. See
also leg. 23, tit. 11, Partida 4, and leg. 26, tit. 13, Partida 5. See
also the 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, 24th and 25th paragraphs of the
Commentary of Hannay on the 15th law of Toro.
The arras of the wife, or the property given to the woman by the
man, in consideration of the marriage-the donations, propter nuptias, or that property which either gave to the other freely and
without condition; the dower which the wife brought to the husband, and inheritances under certain circumstances by either the
husband or wife from the children of the marriage, constitute the
property acquircd by lucrative title, which was to be reserved, for
the children of the marriage by and during which it was acquired.
The 15th law of Toro provided, that in all cases in which women
marrying a second time, were under obligation to reserve to the
children of the first marriage the property received from the first
husband or inherited from the children of the first marriage, in like
cases, men who shall marry a second or third time shall be under
obligation to reserve the property acquired by the first or second
marriage to the children of that marriage ; and that the same rules
in respect to women who married a second time, should apply to
men who married a second or third time.
The Commentary of Llamos on the 15th law of Toro, in which
he quotes the opinions and expressions of *manyother commentators, show in the clearest manner possible, the reasons and principles in which the 14th law of Toro had its origin, and the substance
of the whole is, that inasmuch as the community or ganancial pro-
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perty is acquired by onerous title, as distinguished from lucrative
title, the surviving husband or wife shall have the power freely to
dispose of their portion of such ganancial property without being
under any obligation to reserve it for the children of the marriage
during which it was acquired, in the same manner that they were
required to reserve property acquired by lucrative title to the
children of the marriage by which it was acquired.
If the 14th law of Toro had not been promulgated with particular
reference to the other laws which required a surviving husband or
wife contracting a second marriage to reserve to the children of
the first marriage, the property acquired by such marriage, by
lucrative title, theft it would have ifade no mention of second or
third marriages.
If the object of the law was to endow the surviving husband or
wife with power to sell the whole of the ganancial property acquired
during the marriage, then nothing need have been said about second
and third marriages.
The 16th law of Toro proVides, that where the husband shall
bestow or bequeath to his wife anything at the time of his death, or
in his testament, the thing so bequeathed shall not be charged to
the wife in the part which she is to have of the ganancial property.
In their commentaries upon this law, the Spanish authors discuss,
at great length, the nature and extent of the wife's title or property
in the half of the acquisitions made during the marriage.
Much criticism is lavished upon the words used in leg. 1, tit. 3,
lib. 3 del Fuero Real, where it is said: "To da cosa yue del marido
y muyer ganaren o compraren, estando de consuno hayan to ambos
por medio."
Some of the commentators contend that the verb hayan, is used
in the sense of vesting actual property or dominion in the thing
spoken of. Others deny that the word has so large a signification,
but all agree that upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of one of the spouses, t1he ganancial property vests absolutely, one
half in the survivor and the other half in the heirs of the deceased
partner.
See Commentaries of Llamos Gomez on the 16th law of Toro.
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Sec. 13 of the 5th title of Febrero Reformado treats of the rights
and liabilities appertaining to the conjugal partnership. In paragraph 410, it is said, "The power of alienation which the laws concede to the .husbandonly, continues during the marriage only. The
husband is prohibited from disposing,. by testament, of that portion
of the ganancial property belonging to the wife."
The 412th paragraph of the same section, speaking of the liabilities of the conjugal partnership, says, that they may be divided into
two classes. First, those charges which arise during the existence
of the partnership; and secondly, those relating to the obligations
whibh ought to be discharged out of the effects of the partnership
after its dissolution.
In the first class are enumerated the necessary expenses of maintaining the family and household, the dower given to the daughters
and the donations propter nuptias made to the sons, &c. It is then
said, that after the dissolution of the partnership, the common effects
ought to be chargeable, in the opinion of some, with dower and
donations of the same kind made by one of the spouses after the
death of the other; but this proposition is denied, and the reason
for denying its soundness is, that the partnership being dissolved
by the death of one of the spouses, all its consequences cease.
And in conclusion, it is said, "The only charge to which the
ganancial property is subject, after the death of one of the spouses,
is the payment of the debts contracted during the matrimony by
either of them, provided they originated in the business of. the
partnership itself, and not in the private business of one of the
partners.
In paragraph 406 of the same work, section 12, the ganancial
property, or what is ganancial property, is particularly defined.
And afterwards, in the same work, in treating of the divisiop of
ganancial property between the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased, it is said in paragraph 2396, section 1, title 83, "According to this law," referring to leg. 1, tit. 4, lib. 10, of the Novisima Recop., "according to this law, all the property, of which
we spoke in paragraph 406, which is ganancial, ought to be divided
between the survivor and the heirs of the deceased spouse."
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In the Intitutionu del Derocho Civil de Castilla, by Asso and
MIannel, in treating of the ganancial property and the rights of the
spouses in respect to it, those learned authors say, on page lxii,
chap. 5, title vii, libr. Primero, " Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the survivor may dispose of that part of the ganancial property which belongs to him or her, without being obliged to reserve
it for the children." And what is very conclusive upon the question under discussion, is, that the authority cited by Asso and Mannel, for the proposition just quoted from them, is leg. 6, tit. 9,
lib. 5, of the Recopilacion, which is also the 14th law of Toro, upon
which the doctrine asserted in the case of Panand v. Jones, 1
Cal. Report, 488, was mainly rested.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana was long distinguished for the
emihent ability of its judges, who made the most profound investigations into the whole bearing of the Spanish law, and who explored
thoroughly every kindred system of jurisprudence, aided, too, by
counsel whose fame as civilians extended throughout the whole
country.
The wonder would indeed be great, if that court, administering
the Spanish law for very nearly half a century, shall have remained
all the while ignorant of one of its most important provisions respecting the partnership which exists between husband and wife
as to their common property. That court has time and again decided the question under consideration, and the principle has
always been asserted and never questioned, that the community of
acquests and gain ceases to exist at the moment of the death of one
of the partners, with all the legal effects resulting from it ; that
each party to the community is seized of one undivided half of the
property composing the mass, and that the survivor cannot validly
alienate the share not belonging to him. In the case of Bromord
vs. Bernard et al. 7 Louisiana Reports, -016, the court said:
"That a community of acquests and gains, as such, continues after
the death of one of the partners, with all the legal effects resulting
from such a relation, with authority in the husband, if he should
survive, to be still regarded as the head of the community, with
power to bind the common propertybynew contracts, and to alienate

